In October 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued SFAS No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets (SFAS 144), which proposes the use of a single accounting model for the sale of durable assets and extends the presentation of continuing operations to a component of a business (not a segment of a business). A component of an entity includes business activities and cash flows that can be clearly distinguished from the rest of the entity, both operationally and for financial reporting purposes. A component of an entity that is considered to be owned or divested is presented as an unpone transaction where the business and cash flows of the component are (or have been) eliminated from the entity`s current operations and the entity will not have a significant continuing interest in the operation of the component. SFAS 144 will enter into force for the company from 1 July 2002 and management is currently reviewing and assessing the impact that this statement will have, if any, on the financial and financial situation of the company. ACE argues that it would be overly damaging for the court to give Johnson the opportunity to amend his amended complaint, because an allegation based exclusively on the June agreement would be “a completely different case.” (I.C. 22 to 15) The Court of Justice is not convinced that this is the right thing to do. In any event, this case is at an early stage and it is unlikely that the proposed amendments will cause substantial surprises or significantly increase the cost of litigation. Furthermore, the disadvantage to Johnson, by requiring him to initiate arbitration proceedings after positively withdrew from the June arbitration agreement and after requesting the opportunity to assert his case solely on the basis of the June agreement, would outweigh any harm caused to ACE by giving Johnson the opportunity to pursue the claims, which are not subject to the March arbitration agreement. ACE also argues that even if it were established that Johnson`s current rights derive exclusively from the June loan agreement, the Court of Justice would nevertheless have to dismiss his actions for unfair trade and fraud, since they are not entitled to a remedy under Rule 12(b)(6) and it has not invoked fraud of sufficient particularity in accordance with Rule 9, point (b). . . .